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Respondents. 
) CASE NO. 202 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellant herewith submits to this Court the follow-
ing issues for disposition upon this appeal:] 
1). Whether a Plaintiff, claiming negligence under the 
theory of res ipsa loquitor, need only present evidence that the 
defendant's negligence was the most likely cause of the injury 
rather than to show such negligence is the only possible cause or 
that no other explanations are available in order for the case to 
go to the jury with an appropriate res ipsa loquitor instruct ion * 
2). Whether the District Court, by dismissing the Plaintiff !)3 
res ipsa loquitor cause of action as a matter of law, by the grant 
of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, has thereby improperly 
invaded the province of the jury; 
3). Whether sufficient genuine issues of material fact were 
remaining in the case to preclude the District Courtfs grant of the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as a matter of law; 
4). Whether the dismissal of the Plaintifffs medical negli-
gence case pleaded under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor prior 
to trial, by motion for summary judgment, was improper and proce-
durally immature; 
5), And, whether strong public policy considerations exist 
requiring the application of the doctrine of res ipsa Loquitor 
as an appropriate theory of negligence in medical negligence cases 
involving the probable infection of the Plaintiff by a hypodermic 
needle administered by a health care provider. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff instituted the instant action by filing her Complainft 
with the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake Countyj, 
on the 25th day of January 1983 to recover damages from the defen-
dants for damages allegedly received when she developed acute sep-
tic shock following the administration of an intramuscular injectioln 
by the defendant hospital's nurse employee, while a patient at said 
hospital, stating a cause under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor 
(Record on Appeal at 2-6). Plaintiff had previously served upon 
the defendant her ninety-day notice of intent to sue giving juris-
diction to the District Court (Record on Appeal at 3). 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, In and For Salt Lake County> 
the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, granted defendants1 Motioh 
for Summary Judgment dismissing, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's 
res ipsa loquitor theory of negligence, and allowing Plaintiff 
thirty (30) days to secure and identify for the record an expert 
witness or face dismissal, following hearing before the Court on 
May 22, 1984 and by minute entry of that same date. Plaintiff 
subsequently identified to the defendants an expert witness but 
later withdrew that designation and entered into a Stipulation witfc 
the defendants to make the previous Order final for purposes of 
appeal of the dismissal of Plaintiff's res ipsa loquitor theory 
of negligence, the same being reduced to Order of the Court on 
August 27, 1984. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the Order of the Third 
District Court dismissing Plaintiff's res ipsa loquitor theory of 
negligence reversed and to have the case remanded to the Court for 
trial on the merits on that theory of negligence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about March 18, 1982, the Plaintiff, a 38-year-old 
woman, was admitted to defendant Latter-Day Saints Hospital to 
undergo a routine tonsillectomy due to a diagnosis by her family 
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physician, Elvon G. Jackson, M.D. , of recurrent tonsillitis 
(Record on Appeal at 107; Record on Appeal hereinafter designated 
as ffR.,f). 
Dr. Jackson performed the tonsillectomy the following day, 
March 19, 1982 (R. at 108). Previous to this time, the Plaintiff f|s 
general health was considered good and unremarkable, all signs of 
infection in the tonsils had subsided prior to the toasillectomy, 
and the procedure was performed without incident and complication 
and the post-operative course was unremarkable (R. at 108). 
The Plaintiff was discharged by Dr. Jackson from the defendar}t 
hospital on March 20, 1982 (R. at 108). Dr. Jackson ordered an 
intra-muscular injection of a pain relieving drug, Demerol, which 
was injected into the Plaintiff's hip area as she was leaving the 
hospital on March 20, 1982 (R. at 108). 
The Plaintiff was readmitted to the defendant hospital's 
Emergency Room on March 21, 1982 at 1900 hours with severe pain 
over the left hip/buttock area wherein the injection of the pain 
relieving drug had been administered (R. at 108). 
The Plaintiff was subsequently admitted to the 4-South 
Intensive Care Unit due to the fact that she was f?acutely ill1' 
due to acute septic shock (bacterial poisoning of the blood 
stream) (R. at 108). 
The Plaintiff was suffering from fever, rapid pulse, and 
prostration (R. at 108). The internist on call, Harold S. Cole, 
M.D., took charge of the case and consulted with Dr. Jackson 
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(R. at 108). 
The events of paino.and other symptoms preceded the appearance) 
of fever or signs of infection in any other place^and furthermore, 
there were no other pains in other areas of the Plaintiff's body 
(R. at 108). 
The evening of Plaintiff's admission to defendant hospital's 
Emergency Room on March 21, 1982, all of the consulting physicians), 
consisted of Dr. Elvon G. Jackson, Dr. Harold S. Cole, Dr. John P. 
Burke (defendant hospital's staff Infectious Diseases Consultant) 
and a>Dr. Alhoy, were in agreement that the most likely event was 
that the infection suffered by the Plaintiff was introduced by thel 
needle employed in administration of the Demerol injection rather 
than it came from any other source (R. at 109). 
Despite the previous tonsillectomy procedure, the Plaintiff's! 
throat did not show signs of infection, and in fact tested nega-
tive for the type of organism that was found to be present in her 
hip abscess (R. at 109). 
The area of Plaintiff's hip/buttocks was aspirated and tested 
and shown to be infected with Beta Hemolytic Strep, Group "A" 
(R. at 109). Again, her throat culture, relative to the tonsil-
lectomy procedure, did not show the presence of that organism 
(R. at 109). 
Due to the severity of the infection at the hip/buttock 
injection site, Plaintiff's physicians surgically removed, en bloc), 
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a portion of the gluteal muscle and tissue down through the fat 
and subcutaneous tissue to the deep fascia and muscle, excising 
the entire area in one elliptical piece (R. at 109)• 
At that time, the Plaintiff suffered from a fever of 104 
degrees Farenheit and required the drug Dopamine to sustain her 
pulse and blood pressure (R. at 109). 
Plaintiff remained in the defendant hospital for a contin-
uous period of twenty-one days and incurred hospital costs alone 
of $11,295.46.(R. at 110). 
Plaintiff prepared and served her ninety-day notice of intent 
to sue in accordance with the Utah Health Care Malprastice Act and, 
being unable to reach a resolution with the defendants, filed her 
Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, In and For Salt 
Lake County, on or about January 25, 1983 (R. at 2). 
Defendants answered the Plaintiff's Complaint and the parties 
commenced extensive discovery on the issuesy Plaintiff did not 
identify and expert witness to the record and proceeded on the 
theory of res ipsa loquitor (See Record on Appeal generally). 
There is no dispute evident on the record that the injection 
in issue in the action was administered by an employee of the 
defendant hospital and that the instrumentality employed to 
administer the same was in the exclusive control of that employee 
(R. at 101-102). 
On or about March 20, 1984, Defendants filed their Motion 
for Summary Judgment and supporting affidavits and memoranda 
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seeking primarily to dismiss Plaintiff's cause of action based 
upon the legal theory of res ipsa loquitor and compelling Plaintiff 
to produce expert testimony to establish negligence and the 
standard of care (R. at 87-106). 
Plaintiff filed responsive memoranda and the Motion was 
noticed for hearing before the Court, the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, for May 22, 1984 (R. at 154). 
The Motion was argued before the Court on May 22, 1984 and 
taken under advisement by the Court. The decision was rendered 
by Minute Entry of May 22, 1984, which ruledr in pertinent part, 
as follows: 
The Court feels that the infection could have 
been caused other than by the negligence of 
defendants. Res Ipsa Loquitor is not an 
appropriate theory. Defendants1 Motion is 
granted with to to plaintiff to provide an 
expert and establish a standard of care and 
theory of negligence within thirty (30) days. 
(R. at 157). 
The Plaintiff subsequently identified an expert witness to 
the Defendants but later withdrew that designation and entered in-< 
to a Stipulation with the Defendants giving finality to the Courtis 
May 22, 1984 Order to facilitate appeal on the issue of applica-
bility of the res ipsa loquitor doctrine (R. at 164). That 
Stipulation resulted in a final order of August 27, 1984 (R. at 
166). 
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Plaintiff represents to this Court for explanatory purposes 
that the expert witness designation was withdrawn as the expert 
could not definitively testify on issues of negligence without 
the instrumentality, i.e. the needle and syringe. It was a fact 
established on this record that the needle employed in the 
injection in question was a pre-packaged, single lot injection 
which is disposed of after use (see e.g., R. at 101-102). 
Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal with the Salt Lake 
County Clerk on September 21, 1984 (R. at 167). 
Many of the record references made above are to the factual 
statement of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment; that Memorandum contains within it further 
references to the depositions of the medical personnel designated 
to this record as R. at 174, 175, 176, 177 and 178 respectively, 
and being a part of this record. Appellant urges a complete 
review of these depositions by this Court for a complete under-
standing the the attenuating medical circumstances involved. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred by dismissing Plaintiff's cause of 
action under the legal theory of res ipsa loquitor by summary 
judgment for several reasons. First, a Plaintiff need only present 
evidence that the defendant's negligence was the most likely cause 
of the Plaintiff's injury; it is not necessary that it is the only 
possible cause or that no other explanations are available. 
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However, the District Court, by its decision of May 22, 1984, 
rendered a finding that the Plaintiff must rule out all other 
possible causes, without opportunity for a trial, in order to 
proceed on the theory. 
To grant such a Motion without trial improperly invades the 
province of the jury as it is the duty^of the jury to consider 
the defendant's negligence in a case under res ipsa loquitor; 
once a Plaintiff has merely established the elements of the 
theory, the Plaintiff is entitled to an instruction to the jury 
on the theory. 
Dismissal of a medical negligence case for failure to provide 
expert testimony prior to trial is improper and premature in any 
event as a Plaintiff has until the close of the case in chief to 
present such testimony and it is unknown to the Court until that 
time whether such testimony is forthcoming. The District Court 
in the instant case knew only that Plaintiff was proceeding 
under res ipsa loquitor and improperly assumed the lack of expert 
medical testimony. 
Disposing of the instant case under its res ipsa loquitor 
theory by summary judgment was in error as sufficient genuine 
issues of material fact were present before the trial court to 
preclude the grant of a Motion for summary judgment as a matter of 
law. 
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Strong considerations of sound public policy exist to requirie 
the application of res ipsa loquitor as an appropriate theory of 
negligence in the instant case. The instrumentality of damage, 
the needle and syringe, are disposed of immediately after use 
such that the same is not available to a plaintiff or a plaintiff|fs 
expert and unfairly disables a Plaintiff's cause of action againslt 
a health care provider for damages precipitated by & needle. 
Without application of res ipsa loquitor as an appropriate theory 
of negligence, a health care provider need only dispose of the 
instrumentality in the normal course of operations to shield it-
self from any actual negligence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE THEORY OF RES IPSA 
LOQUITOR BY GRANTING DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
A. A Plaintiff Need Only Present Evidence That 
The Defendants1 Negligence Was The Most 
Likely Cause of Plaintiff's Injury—Not That 
It Is The Only Possible Cause Or That No Other 
Explanations Are Available. 
In order to submit a case to the jury on the theory of res 
ipsa loquitor, a Plaintiff needs to meet the requisite elements 
of the theory, specifically that 1). the accident was of a kind 
which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened 
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if due care had been observed; 2). that the Plaintiff's own use of) 
the agency or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for 
the injury; and 3). that the agency or instrumentality was under 
the exclusive management and control of the defendant. Kusy v. 
K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P. 2d 1232, 1235(Utah 1984). 
One of the purposes of the res ipsa instruction is to Mcast 
the burden upon the person who controlled the agency or instrumen-
tality causing the injury to make proof of what happened." Id., 
Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of the elementls, 
he is entitled to a res ipsa instruction. The trial court should 
not weigh the conflicting evidence of the elements; this is the 
jury's function. Id* 
In order to determine the appropriateness of a res ipsa 
instruction, the court must view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff. Id. 
Although the Plaintiff in the instant case was not even 
granted the opportunity to present her evidence at trial under her: 
res ipsa theory, the record as constituted at the time defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was heard contained sufficient proof 
of the elements of res ipsa loquitor as stated in Kusy to require 
submission of the case on the theory to a jury at trial, particu-
lary if the facts were viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff. 
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However, Judge Sawaya's decision on the Motion was clearly in 
error as it required a much more stringent quality of evidence to 
support the theory of res ipsa loquitor than the law of Utah 
requires. The minute entry of May 22, 1984 states that the reason 
the Court ruled that res ipsa loquitor was not an appropriate 
theory of negligence was because "...The Court feels that the 
infection could have been caused other than by the negligence of 
the defendants..." (R. at 157; emphasis added). 
The Restatement (Second), at comment (e), provides an excel-
lent statement of the quality of evidence required: 
The Plaintiff!s burden of proof (in a res 
ipsa case) requires him to produce evidence 
which will permit the conclusion that it is 
more likely than not that his injuries were 
caused by the defendant's negligence. . . 
The Plaintiff need not, however, conclusively 
exclude all other possible explanations, as so 
prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. . . 
It is enough that the facts proved reasonably 
permit the conclusion that negligence is the 
more probable explanation. 2 Restatement(Second) 
of Torts, §328D, comment (e)(Emphasis added). 
The District Court's decision, however, requires the Plaint if If 
to exclude any an all other possible causes, and therefore imposes 
upon her the obligation to prove her case beyond a reasonable doubjt , 
rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, what 
becomes clear is the error made by the Court in ruling by summary 
judgment; the Court heard noievidence—therefore, how is the Court 
to conclude that there might have been another cause of injury? 
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The error in ruling on the issue by summary judgment will be 
treated in more detail below at Point 1(B) and 1(D). 
Even in bases wherein the application of the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitor is clearly appropriate, there are always other possible 
causes of injury, no matter how remote, as there exist other possi-
bilities in all human affairs. 
The California Court of Appeals in Mittelman v. Seifert, 
94 Cal. Rptr. 654 (Cal. App. 1971), recognized that after the 
Plaintiff meets the conditions for applying the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitor, a presumption of negligence arises which imposes 
upon the defendant the obligation of rebutting the inference. The 
rebuttal, the court noted at page 674, must be by substantial 
evidence and must offer a definite cause for the injury in which 
the defendant's negligence does not inhere apart from mere 
speculation or conjectural evidence.(Emphasis added). 
Likewise, the California Supreme Court speaks in terms of 
probability of cause in Newing v. Cheatham, 124 Cal. Rptr. 193 
(1975), when it describes the standard of evidence required of the 
plaintiff in res ipsa loquitor cases: 
. . .the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is app-
licable where the accident is of such a nature 
that it probably was the result of negligence by 
someone and that the defendant is probably the 
one responsible. . .It need not be concluded that 
negligence is the only explanation of the acci-
dent, but merely the most probable one. 
124 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99 (Emphasis added). 
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The defendant in Newing v. Cheatham advanced the identical 
theory propounded by the Court in the instant case that "...the 
crash could have resulted from causes other than the negligence of 
the decedent." (Emphasis in original). The Court rejected this 
defense as inadequate and held that "...Mere speculation of this 
sort is insufficient to discharge defendants burden of explana-
tion." 124 Cal. Rptr. at 203. 
In Spidle v. Stewart, 402 N.E. 2d 216 (111. 1980), the plain-
tiff brought a medical malpractice action against her physician 
alleging negligence in performing surgery based on the theory of 
res ipsa loquitor. The trial court refused to give a res ipsa 
instruction to the jury. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, 
concluding that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiffs, a jury could have determined that a foundation for 
res ipsa loquitor had been made and that the defendant had been 
negligent. 402 N.E. 2d at 221. The Court held that the Plaintiff 
had to prove that the result ordinarily had negligent antecedents 
but did not have to prove that the result always had negligent 
antecedents. 402 N.E. 2d at 219. (Emphasis added). 
In Cummins v. City of West Linn, 536 P. 2d 455 (Or. 1975), thd 
Plaintiff relied on the theory of res ipsa loquitor to establish 
the defendant's negligence because the Plaintiff lacked any other 
evidence. The trial court entered an involuntary non-suit against 
the Plaintiff and denied a motion for new trial. The Oregon Sup-
reme Court reversed holding the the application of the doctrine wa$ 
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proper: 
The application of res ipsa loquitor is based 
upon probabilities, i.e., if a probability of 
a negligent cause of the accident exceeds the 
probability of a non-negligent cause, then 
this condition is met. . . It is a question of 
probabilities, not certainties. It is also 
unnecessary for the plaintiff to eliminate with 
certainty all other possible causes or inferen-
ces. 536 P. 2d at 458-9. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to medical 
negligence cases in Utah in certain circumstances; however, the 
tenor of Judge Sawaya's ruling in the instant case would lead one 
to believe that the doctrine has no application in the medical 
negligence context* 
Expert testimony is not necessary to establish the standard 
of care in a medical negligence case and res ipsa may be applied 
when the propriety of the treatment received is within the common 
knowledge and experience of laymen. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P. 2d 
348 (Utah 1980); Kim v. Anderson, 610 P. 2d 1270 (Utah 1980) (both 
cases reversing the trial judge in the instant case, Judge James 
S. Sawaya, on the application of the doctrine in medical negli-
gence cases). In Kim v. Anderson, this Court defined the applica-
tion of the doctrine as follows: 
...when the impropriety of treatment complained 
of is of such nature that lay persons could judge 
from common knowledge and experience that such an 
injury would not happen if there had been proper 
skill and care, expert testimony is not necessary. 
610 P. 2d at 1271. 
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Appellant contends that the fact that the same trial judge 
who dismissed her res ipsa theory has been reversed at least twicei 
before on the identical issue should immediately call into ques-
tion the legal sufficiency of the order appealed from in the in-
stant case. It is interesting to note that in both K:,m v. Ander-
son and Nixdorf v. Hicken, the Plaintiffs were at least afforded 
the opportunity to present their evidence prior to having the 
door slammed on their theory of negligence^ Plaintiff in the 
instant case was not even afforded the opportunity to present her 
evidence at trial. 
In Wolfsmith v. Marsh5 337 P. 2d 70 (Calif. 1959), the Court 
held that incidents of infection following a hypodermic needle 
injection are the types of incidents within the common knowledge 
of laymen as to whether they occur ordinarily in the absence of 
negligence., The Plaintiff in that case received an anesthetic 
injection into her knee. Following the injection, she realized 
severe pain in her leg and a small raised bubble at the injection 
site and the tissue at the injection site was firmer than the 
surrounding tissue. Eventually the Plaintiff developed a slough 
ulcer at the needle site which required muscle and tissue exci-
sion. It was determined that the drug injected had not caused the 
reaction and therefore the query was focused upon the injection 
itself. Plaintiff sued on a res ipsa loquitor theory and at trial 
the Court directed a verdict against her, refusing to give a res 
ipsa instruction. The appellate Court reversed, and in employing 
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the identical requisite elements of the doctrine stated by this 
Court in Kusy v. K-Mart, held as follows: 
It is a matter of common knowledge among 
laymen that injections into the arm, as well 
as other portions of the body, do not ordi-
narily cause trouble unless unskillfully done 
or there is^something wrong with the serum. 
337 P. 2d at 72. 
Therefore, the District Court erred, inter alia, by dismissing 
Plaintiff's res ipsa theory on the basis that there "could be" 
other causes of the injury; the District Court has clearly 
imposed an excessive burden of proof upon the Plaintiff not 
required under Utah law or other authorities interpreting the 
doctrine, and did so without hearing any of the Plaintiff's 
evidence. The authorities hold that the doctrine is, in fact, 
directly applicable to the facts of this case and has application 
in this jurisdiction and others to medical negligence cases. 
B. By Dismissing Plaintiff's Res Ipsa 
Loquitor Cause of Action As a Matter 
Of Law, the District Court Has Improp-
erly Invaded The Province Of the Jury. 
By granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
District Court ruled that the theory of res ipsa loquitor was 
inapplicable to the type of case before it without hearing any 
evidence. As the record indicates, the Motion was heard on the 
Court's regular Law and Motion Calendar and was not heard in the 
context of an evidentiary hearing or trial. The application of th£ 
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doctrine cannot be determined in this fashion or in the same mannen 
that such legal issues as jurisdiction, constitutionality or other 
such issues of law can be determined, simply by virtue of the nature 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. 
"Res ipsa loquitor is an evidentiary rule that permits an 
inference of negligence on the part of a defendant under well-
defined circumstances." Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 
supra, at 1235. (Emphasis added). 
The applicability of the doctrine, and hence whet tier the 
proponent is entitled to an instruction on the theory, depends 
entirely upon the proponents evidence at the close of bis presen-
tation thereof which is before the Court. The application is not 
a matter of law to the extent that an issue sukh as governmental 
immunity is, but depends entirely upon a determination made after 
the evidence is in. To decide the applicability of the doctrine atj 
a pre-trial stage is to ignore what the doctrine is—a rule of 
evidence. 
This Court made it clear that a decision on the applicability 
of the doctrine by the trial court invades the province of the jury) 
to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence: 
The trial court should not weigh conflicting 
evidence of the elements (of res ipsa)^ this 
is the jury's function. Kusy v. K-Mart, supra 
at 1235 (parenthetical comment added). 
The Restatement(Second) provides as follows: 
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The conclusion (of defendants negligence in 
a res ipsa case) is not for the Court to draw, 
or to refuse to draw, in any case where either 
conclusion is reasonable; and even though the 
Court would not itself find negligence, it must 
still leave the question to the jury if reason-
able men might do so. 2 Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, §328D, comment (e) (1965). (Parenthetical 
comment added). 
In Spindle v. Stewart, supra, a medical negligence case brought 
under theory of res ipsa loquitor, the Court held: 
Factual disputes presenting credibility questions 
or requiring evidence to be weighed should not be 
decided by the trial judge as a matter of law. 
402 N.E. 2d at 220. 
Stating the error quite simply, the District Court rendered a 
decision on a rule of evidence without having heard any evidence. 
The District Court has therefore rendered a decision without any 
foundation in the record—virtually from "thin air"—stating suffi-
cient grounds for reversal standing alone. 
C. Sufficient Genuine Issues of Material 
Fact Were Present in This Action to 
Preclude the Grant of Defendants1 Motion 
For Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
It is essential to observe in this action that Plaintiff is 
before this Court appealing the granting of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment; a trial was not held nor evidence taken. An analysis of 
the grounds necessary to award a summary judgment of dismissal to 
a moving defendant exposes yet another gross error committed by th^ 
District Court. 
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A summary judgment motion must be supported by evidence, 
admissions, and__inferences which, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the opposing party, establishes that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P. 2d 
790 (Utah 1979). 
A motion for summary judgment is a harsh measure, and for this 
reason a plaintiff's contentions must be considered in a light most 
to his advantage and all doubts resolved in favor of permitting himl 
to go to trial; and only if when the whole matter is so viewed, he 
could, nevertheless, establish no right to recovery, should the 
motion be granted. Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413 
P. 2d 807 (Utah 1966). 
In negligence cases, summary judgment is appropriate only in 
the most clear-cut cases. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P. 2d 434 
(Utah 1982). 
Many issues of fact remained for resolution at the time of 
hearing on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The instant 
case, as is true with most medical negligence cases, contained 
many factual issues. These issues were plain on the record and 
framed by the depositions of three (3) physicians, one nurse 
practitioner, and the Plaintiff, and the affidavits filed in 
support of the Motion. As argued above, there was a substantial 
factual issue as to whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor 
was approriate under the facts of this case. Several other issues 
remained, including, but certainly not limited to, the following: 
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Source of the Infection; In support of its Motion, the defen-
dants filed the Affidavit of John P. Burke, M.D., the defendant 
hospital's Infectious Disease Consultant, who raised the issue of 
whether the infection migrated to the injection site from the 
Plaintifffs tonsil area incident to the previous tonsillectomy. 
(R. at 97-100). However, Plaintiff cited to the Court deposition 
testimony taken from Dr. Elvon G. Jackson, the physician in charge 
Df the tonsillectomy case and the shock case, in her Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment suggesting that this 
nigration process did not occur, as follows: 
Q: (By Mr. Shields): Dr. Jackson, concerning 
the tonsillectomies, and,.particularly in Amy's 
case, was there a clinically signficant risk that 
this procedure (the T k A) would cause the bacteria 
giving rise to the tonsillitis to be seeded into 
her bloodstream? 
A: I—I don't believe so. (R. at 113; see also, 
(R. at 174, page 26 (Jackson Deposition)). 
Additional deposition testimony taken from the defendants' 
Infection Control Practitioner, one Julie Jacobsen, was cited to 
the Court in Plaintiff's opposing memorandum regarding the source 
of the infection, as follows: 
Q: (By Mr. Shields): As I understand it, Mrs. 
Robinson was diagnosed as having hospital-
acquired beta strep, Lancefield Group "A" 
on the hip injection site. 
A: That's correct. 
Q- Any question about that? 
A: None at all. 
(continued following page) 
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Q: This occurred in her left buttock, where 
that was injected? 
A; Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q: Is this type of infection what's called 
"nosocomial?" Is that the name of it? 
A: Hospital-acquired, uh-huh (affirmative). 
(R. at 115; see also R. at 176, page 20). 
Testimony from the internist on call the evening of the seconld 
admission, Dr. Harold S. Cole, cited to the Court in the opposing 
memorandum raised additional issues of fact and credibility of 
witnesses, as follows: 
A: (By the Witness): Well, the evening of 
admission, all of us were in agreement that 
the most likely event was that the infection 
was introduced with that needle rather than 
it came from somewhere else. Now, I — and 
I concurred in that opinion. We were suffic-
iently concerned about that that we sent her to 
surgery to have the area removed, which we would 
not have done had we felt an infection froa some-
where else had migrated there. (R. at 116j see 
also R. at 178, page 14). 
The citations to the record above, all of which were before 
the District Court at the May 22, 1984 hearing, clearly show there 
is an issue as to the exact source of the infection and/or whether 
multiple sources existed, framed by evidently conflicting testimonjy 
from the physicians involved in the treatment of the Plaintiff. 
The defendants, in their Reply Memorandum, raised an 
explanation to the testimony of Julie Jacobsen, suggesting that 
Plaintiff1s interpretation of the meaning of that testimony was 
incorrect, raising a further issue of fact. (R. at 126). 
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Contribution by Plaintiff to Injury: Defendant raised the 
issue in its Reply Memorandum that the infection could have been 
precipitated, in whole or in part, by the conduct of the Plaintiff 
and/or her husband touching the needle injection site by citing to 
page 57 of the Plaintifffs deposition wherein she stated that at 
one point prior to her discharge from the hospital her husband 
climbed into bed with her and TTtouched her all over.n (R. at 124)* 
Plaintiff contended and does now contend that the assertion of 
contribution is without merit based on the testimony of the 
treating physicians cited hereinabove and as cited to the District 
Court; nonetheless, the same raises genuine issues of material 
fact which impact on the third key element of the res ipsa 
loquitor doctrine, and perhaps other aspects of the lawsuit. 
The record in this action as a whole, and the citations 
of factual matters contained hereinabove demonstrate clearly that 
there were genuine issues of material fact remaining in the case 
relative to the res ipsa loquitor issue and other material issues 
precluding summary judgment as a matter of law under the standards 
regarding such motions stated in Bihlmaier v. Carson, Controlled 
Receivables, Inc. v. Harmon, and Bowen v. Riverton City, all supra, 
D. Dismissal of a Medical Negligence Case 
Pleaded Under the Doctrine of Res Ipsa 
Loquitor Prior to Trial is Improper and 
Procedurally Premature. 
In making its ruling as it did, the District Court flatly 
refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to the facts 
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of the instant case merely because it was a medical negligence easel 
where the Plaintiff had not already produced an expert witness to 
support a:theory of "straight" medical negligence. 
However, to dismiss a medical negligence case pleaded under 
res ipsa loquitor at any time prior to trial is improper and proce-
durally premature. This is because a Plaintiff has until the close! 
of his case-in-chief to attempt to make a case under res ipsa 
loquitor and to produce expert testimony if he chooses to do so. 
As argued under Point I, subpoint (B) above, res ipsa loquitor 
is a doctrine of evidence and logically cannot be applied or re-
fused until some evidence is heard; and in the instant case, the 
Court took no evidence but ruled on the issue as a matter of law. 
It is not a matter of law, but a matter of evidence. 
Even in medical negligence cases, where expert testimony is 
always an issue, the cases recently before this Court have not been; 
ruled upon by the trial court until the Plaintiff's case-in-chief 
was in. See, e.g., Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra, and Kim v. Anderson, 
supra. In fact, none of the cases cited above involving applica-
tion of the doctrine were resolved without trial. 
Further, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an expert 
does not have to be produced or made available until time of trial, 
unless "exceptional circumstances" are demonstrated. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(b)(4). In the instant case, the sum total of 
discovery propounded by the defendants was the taking cf the 
Plaintiff's deposition; never at any time was the identity of any 
-24-
expert retained by the Plaintiff sought by discovery nor was any 
appropriate motion brought by the defendants. Therefore, the 
District Court concluded without any basis in fact whatsoever that 
the Plaintiff either did not or could not obtain and present expert 
testimony on the issue. 
Further, by requiring the Plaintiff to present expert testimony 
in some form within thirty (30) days of the granting of the Defen-
dants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court far exceeded its 
authority under Rule 26(b)(4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
District Court took upon itself the task of conducting discovery 
Ithat the Defendants themselves could not conduct in such manner 
gander Rule 26(b)(4). As argued above, this Court has attempted 
[repeatedly to inform this particular trial judge on the appopriate 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to medical negli-
gence issues,, but evidently to no avail; this Court needs to again 
Undertake that task by reversing the Order rendered by the District 
Court in this case. 
POINT II 
STRONG PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS EXIST REQUIRING 
THE APPLICATION OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR AS AN APPR0Z 
PRIATE THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE IN NEEDLE INFECTION CASES. 
As this Court stated in Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 
^upra, the purpose of application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
PLoquitor is to "...cast the burden upon the person who controlled 
the agency or instrumentality causing the injury to make proof 
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of what happened." 681 P. 2d at 1235. 
Implicit in that definition of purpose of the doctrine is the 
inherent conclusion that the person having control of the instru-
mentality of damage has a distinct and inequitable advantage over 
the Plaintiff relative to the burden of proof, and therefore, such 
person should then bear the burden of showing what really occurred< 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is founded upon sound 
principals of public policy and justice. Although a Plaintiff 
generally does and should bear the burden of proof, the circumstan^-
ces of a case should not be allowed to make that burden an impossi^ 
bility; and when it is the defendant who has the exclusive control 
of the instrumentality, which is always a critical item of evidence, 
the Plaintiff's burden of proof does in fact become an impossibil-
ity unless someppresumption evens out the odds. 
The sound principals of public policy and justice supporting 
the doctrine have a very pronounced presence in the instant case. 
As the deposition exerpts quoted above clearly state, the 
physicians involved in the treatment of the Plaintiff felt that 
the needle introduced this severe and debilitating infection into 
her body rather than it came from somewhere else. Whether or not 
these physicians could reach a conclusion of negligence is not the 
point; the point is that the needle was the most likely source of 
the infection. Thus, the question becomes, whose instrumentality 
was the needle? Who controlled it? And, finally, where is the 
instrumentality now? All of these questions are answered in the 
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record and were not significant issues of fact in the case before 
the District Court. The needle belonged to the defendant hospitalf 
was administered by its nurse and employee, Joyce Harbrecht, RN, 
and was disposed of immediately after use as it is a single-dose 
disposable needle. Therefore, the instrumentality, a key piece of 
evidence, is not and never was available to the Plaintiff or any 
expert retained thereby for testing and other evidentiary purposes> 
It is therefore the defendant hospital that had, at all times, the 
custody and control of the instrumentality and could do with it as 
it wished. Is it not then appropriate to shift the burden to this 
defendant to make proof as to what occurred? Without this shift im 
the burden of proof, all that a.defendant needs to do is to dispos<fe 
of the instrumentality, whether by standard operating procedure or 
deliberate concealment, to defeat a Plaintifffs cause of action. 
In the instant case, the record indicates that disposal of the 
needle is standard policy and consistent with the employment of 
singe-dose injectables; however, the situation remains: the 
instrumentality is no longer available as evidence. Permitting th£ 
burden of proof to remain entirely on the Plaintiff in these cir-
cumstances is clearly inequitable and unjust and serves to defeat 
any remedy and right which Plaintiff may have. 
The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in this 
case would not unfairly burden the defendants1 defense; the 
defendant hospital may still attempt to make proof that the infec-
tion migrated from some other situs, that the Plaintiff caused it 
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or that she otherwise brought it with her, or that the infection 
is unavoidable despite the best of sanity measures being taken. 
However, it is they who controlled and disposed of this instrument 
tality of damage and it is they who should bear the burden. 
The unfairness of the burden imposed upon a Plaintiff to makei 
proof without the presumptions of the doctrine being applied to 
"even things upM is most distinct in the medical negligence 
context. The health care industry has protections against liti-
gation afforded to it not enjoyed by other groups of litigants; 
the frequent requirement of expert testimony in view of the well-
known and well documented "conspiracy of silence;" the legislative 
barriers imposed to discourage litigants (e.g., Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act); and the factual complexity inherent in such 
cases. This area of law is where the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tor should find its most widespread application. There is no 
logical reason, in law or in fact, why the Latter-Day Saints 
Hospital in the instant case should be afforded any greater pro-
tection than the K-Mart Apparel Fashion store in Kusy v. K-Mart 
Apparel Fashion Corp., supra. What vaunted pedes/taX does the 
health care industry occupy that would make it* more legally pro-
tectable than a K-Mart store? 
The simple fact to be derived from the instant case is that a 
severly injured Plaintiff has no access to the apparent instru-
mentality of damage due to the exclusive control exercised over it 
by the defendant and is thereby deprived of substantial rights and 
-28-
remedies for redress of her injuries unless able to apply the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to shift the burden of proof to thesie 
defendants. 
Aside from the numerous errors committed by the District Courjt 
in dismissing the caused plealded under the doctrine as argued abovfc, 
the basic conclusion is that this is a case where the doctrine 
is^appropriately applied and the case should go to a jury on the 
doctrine for final disposition. The Plaintiff demonstrated the 
elements of res ipsa loquitor and the circumstances of this case 
provide numerous policy reasons favoring the application of the 
doctrine in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the 
Plaintiff's causes of action pleaded under the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitor on the grounds, as stated in its Minute Entry, that 
the injury ncould have'1 been caused by other factors. The doctrin^ 
does not require the Plaintiff to rule out other causes with 
certainty, but requires only that the negligence of the defendant 
be the most likely cause of the injury. Further, by dismissing th3 
Plaintiff's res ipsa causes as a matter of law, the Court has 
improperly invaded the province of the jury as the doctrine is a 
rule of evidence and cannot be ruled upon as a matter of law; the 
District Court took no evidence in respect to its ruling and had 
no cognizable basis upon which to so rule. 
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The issue was improperly decided by summary judgment as many 
genuine issues of material fact were present in the record to pre-
clude the granting of a motion for summary judgment. The facts of 
this case must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Plain-
tiff on both the trial court and appellate court levels under the 
law of Utah, and when so viewed, obvious genuine issues of material 
fact remain. Under Utah law, a summary judgment should be granted 
only in the most clear-cut negligence cases. 
The District Court further erred in ruling as it did on the 
basis that the Plaintiff had not provided expert testimony and was 
entirely premature in doing so. A Plaintiff has until the close oi 
his case in chief to so produce expert testimony, and by compelling) 
the Plaintiff to locate an expert within thirty (30) days of the 
date of ruling, the Court took it upon itself to conduct discovery 
in advance of trial to an extent not permitted even to the parties 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26. 
Sound considerations of public policy further exist requiring 
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to the facts 
of the instant case. The doctrine is designed to shift the burden 
to show what occurred to the party in control of the instrumen-
tality of damage, and inherent in that definition is the fact that 
the person having control of the instrumentality possesses an 
unfair and inequitable advantage over a Plaintiff due to its abili-» 
ty to make free disposition of the key item of evidence. These 
considerations are pronounced in the instant case as it is clear 
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that the needle was the property of defendant and in the exclusive 
control of the defendant and the injection was administered by the 
defendants nurse and employee; thereafter, the same was disposed 
of and not available to the Plaintiff as a necessary and key item j 
of evidence. The doctrine should have its most widespread use in 
the medical negligence context due to the special privileges and 
protections in litigation afforded to the health care industry not 
afforded to other groups of litigants; special legislation, the 
well-known and well documented Conspiracy of silence," and the 
inherent factual complexity of the cases. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant prays for an Order of this Court finding 
that res ipsa loquitor is an appropriate theory of negligence in 
this case, and reversing the Order of the District Court and 
remanding this matter for trial by jury on the merits thereof. 
DATED this 14th day of January, A.D. 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIELDS, SHIELDS & HOLMGREN 
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